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Abstract. Improving the performance of supply chains is a critical issue in 
nowadays industry. In that purpose, cooperation between partners motivates a 
great attention. Technical aspects of current cooperation procedures as 
promoted by large companies are firstly described, and compared to some real 
problems identified after interviews in the aeronautical industry. Technical 
issues are in our opinion insufficient for fully explaining the described 
situations. Therefore, behavioral concepts suggested in the literature of 
management and sociology of organizations are explored and conceptual 
models linking the selected concepts are suggested, allowing to have a deeper 
understanding of real cooperation situations.
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1 Introduction
Relationships between SMEs and large companies is a critical issue in the aeronautic
context. Within different frameworks, the authors have participated to interviews of 
supply chain's partners of the aeronautic industry in the South-West of France, and to 
projects involving them. On the base of these interviews, concepts suggested in the 
areas of management and sociology of organizations have been considered for 
formalizing cooperation situations in supply chains. 
2 Improvements of Supply Chains: a Technical View 
The challenge of supply chain management is to coordinate companies of different 
sizes and cultures, which have local strategies and objectives, in a way which satisfies 
the global objectives of the supply chain. Two main principles may be used for an 
operational coordination of the partners in a supply chain: centralized or decentralized 
planning. In practice, centralized planning using APS (Advanced Planning Systems 
[1]) is not adapted to the coordination of independent entities, which have to preserve 
their autonomy. "Push" an "pull" methods may be used for a point-to-point 
management of Supply chains. MRP (Manufacturing Resource Planning [2]) is the 
most well known of the push methods. "Pull" methods, like just-in-time and lean 
manufacturing require a drastic simplification of the material flows, resulting in a
simplified management.
The strategy of the focal companies of the aeronautical domain mainly consists in 
spreading the principles and tools of MRP towards their suppliers, especially the 
smallest ones. Huge efforts for increasing the flexibility and reactivity of the chain
through lean manufacturing have also been recently made recently. Some critical 
aspects of the point of view of suppliers and customers on these questions, and more 
generally on cooperation, are summarized in next section.
3 Summary of Interviews and Projects 
The situations described afterwards have mainly been identified through projects and 
interviews involving around 20 SMEs and 5 large companies (see details in [3, 4]).
3.1 Customers Points of View
The efforts of the large customers for improving SC performance are mainly directed 
on the SMEs, for which they have noticed that the service ratio is conversely 
proportional to the load. In order to address this problem, the customers have a multi-
facetted strategy:
- Some of them try to protect their weaker suppliers, for instance by giving them 
programs with larger firm periods than their customers do for themselves.
- Most of the customers ask for evidences of proper use of production management 
tools before agreeing a supplier. For instance, some of them ask for examples of a 
middle term load planning, for being sure that the supplier is able to create a "control 
loop" giving him some visibility.
- The customers ask their suppliers to be certified, in order to show their capacity in 
Quality Management. Suppliers which are not yet "mature" in production 
management, but are considered as having a "potential" of development are selected 
for "supplier development" projects. Techniques such as MRP or Lean Manufacturing 
are mainly promoted in that purpose.
- One of the customers informs his suppliers on his stock level, so that they can 
anticipate the real effect of a late delivery. The aim is to increase the sense of 
responsibility of the supplier.
- For large companies, there will be soon a "critical size" for participating in an 
aeronautical supply chain.
- SMEs are encouraged to join "clusters" for reaching this size. The objective is to 
simplify the management of the supply chain by decreasing the number of partners. In 
spite of these efforts, the large companies are globally disappointed by the goodwill 
of their suppliers, and by the effects of their projects.
3.2 Suppliers Points of View
Production management is indeed considered as an "administrative work" by many 
SMEs. The logic of the MRP method is often poorly understood: having an a-priori 
estimation of their internal cycle times is for instance considered as impossible for 
most of the SMEs. On the opposite, they all have developed internal procedures 
allowing to group orders according to technological constraints in order to decrease 
set-up times, and so to meet the customer's expectations regarding the costs. These 
calculations are performed on MS Excel© or on MS Access©, the resulting 
production plan being not re-introduced in the production management system.
The long supply times of some alloys (around one year) make that firm orders 
have to be sent to the raw material providers on the base of uncertain programs. For 
the suppliers, "risk sharing" promoted by customers mainly means "risk sent to the 
suppliers" since they do not see the protective aspects included in their contracts.
Moreover, their contract often includes an article saying that it could be cancelled as 
soon as better prices were got from another supplier1. All the suppliers gave us 
examples of more and more complex parts removed from their production plan for 
being processed in low cost countries, sometimes without explanation... Specific 
requirements are always added by the customers to standard certifications (like ISO 
9000). A surface treatment company was for instance subject to a certification of 800
product/process couples per year. For all the suppliers, dialog is more and more 
difficult with the customers, since their contacts are often managed by young 
engineers having a poor technical competence on the processes, but a hard pressure 
concerning costs and delays. Lean manufacturing is often considered as an attempt of
the customers to decrease their autonomy; a "first in-first out" logic is for instance 
promoted for surface treatment companies, which internal delays are hardly 
predictable by the customers. In that case, the SME would not be able to have its own 
strategy regarding priorities, for example they use to privilege the interests of the 
"best" customer. The possibility that small companies define their own way for 
continuous improvement was discussed during a public debate gathering large and 
small companies. A person from a large company cut the debate arguing that "it was 
very dangerous to let SMEs think that they can do what they want. The solutions 
being known, the only problem for SMEs was to implement them...".
We shall show in next section that concepts currently used by academics from 
management science or sociology of organizations may provide an interesting point of 
view on these issues.
4 Concepts Linked to Behavioral Issues in Supply Chains 
Risks in supply chains are usually associated either to product demand or to product 
supply (linked to capacity limitations, supply disruptions) [5]. The buyer can try to 
cope with the risks linked to the necessity to synchronize actions with its suppliers by 
formalizing communication rules, while keeping a clear distance with them: this 
1 For the customers, this point is only meant for keeping some pressure, since they consider that 
the suppliers know that approving a new supplier is a costly and long procedure.
strategy is called "arm's length relationship" in the literature, and can be compared to 
the "formal contracted rules and procedures" considered by Williamson [6]. Anyway, 
collaborative arrangements are nowadays preferred to arm’s length trading or full 
integration approaches (see for instance [7]). Cooperation is sustained by 
communication and knowledge sharing and is considered both as a way to cope with 
risk and as a new potential source of risk, since it creates the opportunity that a 
partner exploits the other [8]. To avoid this, the first solution for the customer is to 
"control" the supplier: "control mechanisms are necessary to reduce opportunistic 
behaviors" [9]. Control requires power; the relative power of an organization over 
another is the result of the net dependence2 of the one on the other [10]. Coercive 
power (punishment and reward), non coercive power (which indirectly affects the 
partner's behavior by changing its business objectives, etc.), contracts and relational 
norms are usual control mechanisms. Coercive power decreases the risk linked to 
cooperation at short term, but leads to conflicts [11], reduce willingness to cooperate 
[12], damage channel’s member satisfaction [12], and causes the collapse of mutual 
trust and commitment [13]. Coercive strategies decrease the extent of shared beliefs 
[14]. On the opposite, non coercive power focuses on common beliefs and attitudes.
"Supplier development" summarizes efforts made by a buyer in order to increase 
the number of viable suppliers and improve supplier's performance or capability [15].
A problem is that the buyers must determine what knowledge and resource 
investments are likely to yield benefits if transferred to suppliers [16]. If the 
appropriate mechanisms are not in place, the suppliers may not perceive the benefits 
associated with these investments and may reject the initiative to modify or improve 
their processes [16].
Verbeek [17] uses the "script" concept [18, 19] for suggesting that technological 
prescriptions may be used in supply chains for influencing human actions. For us, the 
MRP method, the production management tools or the lean manufacturing principles 
can be seen as "scripts" aiming at substituting to the informal culture of the small 
suppliers, based on tacit knowledge, formalized procedures allowing to better predict 
the supplier's behavior.
The contract is also supposed to protect against opportunistic behaviors [6] by 
creating formal rules and procedures. Nevertheless, contracts seem unable to 
completely prevent opportunism and conflicts are most of the time solved without 
references to the legal aspects [20].
Trust is often seen as an alternative to power: it allows decreasing the required 
level of monitoring of the relationship [8] and is an antecedent to cooperative 
behavior [21]. The role of trust in cooperation has been a prominent theme in the 
literature on buyer-supplier relationship [7]. Trust is defined in SCM as the belief that 
an exchange partner’s work of promise is reliable and that the partner will fulfill his 
obligations [22, 23]. For [21], supplier's trust results from supplier's perception of 
buyer's benevolence3, but also from supplier's perception of buyer's dependability. On 
the opposite, buyer–supplier relationships characterized by asymmetric 
2 Buchanan [29] conceptualized power-dependence imbalances in buyer–supplier relationships 
as the difference in value that buyers and sellers attach to the relationship.
3 Benevolence is usually defined as providing proprietary information or providing assistance 
without compensation [7].
interdependence are often believed to be deficient because the independent partner 
holds higher power and might be attempted to exploit it [25, 26, 27]. A high level of 
total interdependence is usually considered as an indicator for a strong, cooperative 
long-term relationship in which both parties have invested; mutual trust and mutual 
commitment will characterize those relationships [27].
In our opinion, these concepts have a direct "echo" with the situations related in 
section 3. We shall attempt in next section to formalize the links between these 
concepts and to apply the resulting framework on the situations identified through the 
interviews.
5 Modeling the Cooperation Context 
Human behaviors can hardly be described by simple models: our goal is not here to 
describe cooperative situations under a deterministic formalism, but to underline 
different possible "circuits of interaction" between the attributes of cooperation, based 
on the literature analyzed in previous section. These interactions may make the 
cooperation situation evolve either positively or negatively.
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Fig. 1. Limitations of coercive control
Within the various concepts listed in previous section, let us distinguish between:
- those describing the context of the relationship, e.g. level of dependence of the 
partners, risks that they are facing (white boxes in the figures) etc.,
- the attitudes of the partners (willingness to cooperate, trust, opportunism, etc...) 
(grey boxes in the figures),
- the actions (control, influence, information sharing), which influence/are influenced 
both by the context and attitudes (black boxes in the figures).
In Figures 1 and 2, an attempt has been made to suggest qualitative models for 
describing the type of relation between two entities. As usually in such models, "+" 
means that an increase of the level of the influencing entity provokes an increase of 
the level of the influenced one (conversely for "-").
In Figure 1 are summarized as an example the limitations of coercive control in the 
present context of aeronautical supply chains. In bold lines is suggested a classical 
reasoning of the customers: the dependence of the supplier (as it is usually the case 
when suppliers are SMEs) gives power to the customer. Power creates the possibility 
to mitigate risk (mainly due to uncertainties) by controlling the suppliers through 
coercive control, in order to prevent opportunistic behaviors. The limitation of these 
opportunistic behaviors is considered as decreasing the risk. Similarly, coercive 
control also allows to prescribe values/beliefs/tools which should participate to 
decrease the level of risk. In the situations described in section 3, the possibility to 
cancel a contract is an example of threat clearly linked to coercive control. Imposing 
the use of production management tools can be seen as prescribing values (see the 
"script" concept). Number "1" on Figure 1 shows the expected decrease of risk as a 
result from these actions. The interviews clearly show the possibility or other - less 
favorable - interactions: asymmetrical dependence and coercive control decrease trust, 
which prevents from adopting the customer's prescribed values, especially if they are 
far from the culture of the SMEs preferring action to procedures [28]. While limiting 
opportunism, coercive control also limits commitment, preventing the supplier from 
taking initiatives and decreasing its flexibility and reactivity. As a result, the 
possibility exists that risks are increased (circuit 2 on Figure 1) more than decreased 
by the conditions of control.
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Fig. 2. Limitations of supplier development
In Figure 2 are illustrated some problems linked to supplier development. 
"Maturity" is considered as linked to the use of formalized methods, like MRP or lean 
manufacturing. As seen in the interviews, some (rare) companies are also open to 
information sharing (e.g. concerning their stock level) for increasing the 
consciousness of the suppliers, and to show their own trust. This "virtuous" circuit 
may be possible in some cases, but it suffers in our opinion from an "original sin": the 
asymmetrical dependence between partners, which reassures the customers but 
prevents real trust to be established from the supplier's side. Indeed, the power of the 
large companies make that SMEs must show an appearance of adoption of these new 
methods and tools, even if these new values are not fully shared. The formal 
values/beliefs transmitted to the suppliers, not fully understood nor used, may 
decrease the use of the traditional "informal" methods insuring reactivity, and may as 
a consequence participate to increasing risk.
6 Conclusion
Through some real examples, we have tried to show that the efforts conducted by 
large companies of the aeronautic sector for improving their cooperation with their 
small suppliers do not always have the expected effects. Concepts suggested in the 
domains of sociology of organizations and management have been used in order to 
provide a better understanding of the observed situations. The first perspectives of this 
preliminary work concern the production of complementary conceptual models linked 
to other situations. The validation of these models will then been addressed, including 
the definition of criteria allowing a quantitative assessment of the identified 
behaviors. The diagnosis of the reasons of the observed attitudes and beliefs, based 
both on technical and behavioral aspects, will then be addressed.
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